Recent Developments: Willy v. Coastal Corp.: Rule 11 Sanctions Upheld Although the Federal District Court Was Subsequently Found to Lack Jurisdiction by Cohen, Carol Nakhuda
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 22
Number 3 Spring, 1992 Article 12
1992
Recent Developments: Willy v. Coastal Corp.: Rule
11 Sanctions Upheld Although the Federal District
Court Was Subsequently Found to Lack
Jurisdiction
Carol Nakhuda Cohen
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cohen, Carol Nakhuda (1992) "Recent Developments: Willy v. Coastal Corp.: Rule 11 Sanctions Upheld Although the Federal
District Court Was Subsequently Found to Lack Jurisdiction," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 22 : No. 3 , Article 12.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol22/iss3/12
ations for upholding Parden far out-
weighed the arguments for departure 
from its original interpretation ofFELA 
in 1964. Id. at 564. 
The Court interpreted the fact that 
Congress had not taken any action to 
alter the Court's decision in the 28 
years since Parden was decided as 
meaning that the legislative branch 
was in agreement with the holding. Id. 
The Court also recognized that many 
States had acted in reliance upon FELA 
in drafting their workers' compensa-
tion statutes, so that overruling Parden 
would require an extensive legislative 
response to provide coverage to rail-
road workers. Id. Most importantly, 
the Court noted that overruling Parden 
would strip all FELA protection from 
state-employed workers, leaving the 
plaintiffin this case, Hilton, without a 
forum to redress his work related in-
jury.Id. 
In a strongly-worded dissent, Jus-
tice O'Connor argued that the 
majority's overriding concern to leave 
Hilton a forum to redress his injuries 
caused the majority to misapply the 
Court's previous decisions, which 
would have clearly overruled the hold-
ing of Parden. Id. at 566, 570. The 
dissent found no distinction to be made 
between a federal or state forum when 
a plaintiffbrought suit under a federal 
statute. In both situations, the "clear 
statement" rule enunciated in Will 
should have been applied. Id. at 567. 
Thus, based on the holding of Welch, 
that FELA did not contain a clear state-
ment of congressional intent to abro-
gate State immunity, Justice O'Connor 
argued that the Court should overturn 
the remedial provisions of FELA and 
affirm the state courts' decision in 
Hilton. Id. As a result, O'Connor con-
cluded that state legislatures would be 
compelled to redraft statutes which 
excluded railroad workers from cover-
age, in order to provide an alternative 
remedy, and the plaintiff in this case 
would be denied a remedy in a court of 
law. Id. at 570. 
In Hilton v. South Carolina Public 
Railways Commission, the Supreme 
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Court held that FELA created a cause 
of action against state-owned railroads 
to be enforced in state courts only. The 
Court's decision left state-employed 
railroad workers with a forum of re-
course to redress work-related injuries. 
It also avoided the possibility of re-
quiring an extensive legislative redraft-
ing of many state workers' compensa-
tion statutes, which exclude these work-
ers from coverage because of the draft-
ers' reliance upon previous Supreme 
Court decisions. 
- Linda M Googins 
Willy v. Coastal Corp.: RULE 11 
SANCTIONS UPHELD AL-
THOUGH THE FEDERAL DIS-
TRICT COURT WAS SUBSE-
QUENTL Y FOUND TO LACK 
JURISDICTION. 
In Willy v. Coastal Corp., 112 S. 
Ct. 1076 (1992), a unanimous Court 
concluded that Article III ofthe United 
States Constitution was not violated 
when a federal district court that lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction imposed 
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Those sanctions were of a collateral 
concern to the case because the sanc-
tioned behavior was unrelated to 
Donald J. Willy's effort to convince 
the federal district court that it lacked 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court 
determined that it did not raise the 
issue of a district court adjudicating the 
merits of a "case or controversy" over 
which it lacked jurisdiction. 
Willy filed suit against Coastal Cor-
poration ("Coastal") after he was dis-
charged as in-house counsel. Willy 
alleged that Coastal violated state and 
federal environmental laws and that 
Coastal tenninated his employment due 
to his refusal to participate in these 
alleged transgressions. Willy asserted 
that the termination ofhis employment 
by Coastal violated state and federal 
laws, including ''whistleblower'' pro-
visions. 
Although Willy sued in Texas state 
court, Coastal claimed that there was 
original federal question jurisdiction 
under Title 28, sections 1331 and 1441 
of the United States Code. The case 
was subsequently removed to federal 
district court. Despite Willy's objec-
tions, the district court concluded that 
it had subject matter jurisdiction. The 
district court granted Coastal's motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
and the court also dismissed the pen-
dent state claims made by Willy. In 
addition, the district court allowed 
Coastal's motion for Rule 11 sanc-
tions. The court awarded Coastal 
attorney's fees against Willy and his 
attorney, jointly and severally. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit reversed the district court order 
that dismissed Willy's claims and re-
manded the case to state court. It 
concluded that the complaint did not 
raise claims arising under federal law, 
and thus, the district court lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. The court of 
appeals, however, upheld the Rule 11 
sanctions imposed by the district court, 
and on remand the district court was 
ordered to determine the appropriate 
amount of attorneys' fees to be recov-
ered by Coastal. 
On the second appeal, the court 
affirmed the district court's reassess-
ment of the amount of attorney's fees 
to be paid by Willy and his attorney. 
The court of appeals also rejected 
Willy's objection that the district court 
did not have constitutional authority to 
impose Rule 11 sanctions when it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 
at 1078. The court stated that Rule 11 
sanctions were within the inherent pow-
ers of all federal courts, and therefore, 
the district court had appropriately ex-
ercised this power. 
The United States Supreme Court 
agreed with Willy's argument that in 
the Rules Enabling Act and in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
"implicit premise ... [is] that rules of 
practice and procedure are not neces-
sary of disputes beyond the judicial 
power conferred by Article III." [d. at 
1 078-79 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 
at 28). Notwithstanding that premise, 
the Court responded that this does not 
resolve the case at hand. In Sibbach v. 
Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941), the Court 
"observed that federal courts, in adopt-
ing rules were not free to extend or 
restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a 
statute." Willy, 112 S. Ct. at 1079. 
Federal courts, therefore, cannot adopt 
rules which modify the judicial power 
granted by Article III of the United 
States Constitution. 
Willy argued that the district court 
had overreached the judicial power 
granted by Article III by imposing 
Rule 11 sanctions in a case absent 
subject matter jurisdiction. ''Thus, 
according to petitioner, even had Con-
gress attempted to grant the courts 
authority to impose sanctions in a case 
such as this, the grant would run afoul 
of Article IlL" Willy, 112 S. Ct. at 
1079. Willy conceded that there are 
circumstances in which federal courts 
without subject matter jurisdiction may 
impose sanctions. Nevertheless, he 
contended that federal courts may not 
take such action "against a party who 
has successfully contested jurisdiction." 
Id. at 1079. The Court, however, rea-
soned that "in acknowledging the many 
circumstances in which sanctions can 
be imposed, several which have a statu-
tory basis, petitioner effectively con-
cedes both Congress' general power to 
regulate the courts and its specific 
power to authorize the imposition of 
sanctions." Id. at 1080. 
The Court stated that a federal court 
found lacking subject matter jurisdic-
tion would be precluded from further 
adjudication of the case; ''but such a 
determination does not automatically 
wipe out all proceedings had in the 
district court at a time when the district 
court operated under the misapprehen-
sion that it hadjurisdiction." Id. After 
reviewing other cases, the Court de-
clared that in the interest of maintain-
ing orderly procedure, sanctions should 
be upheld despite a later determination 
that the federal court was without juris-
diction. Id. Furthermore, Rule 11 
sanctions were of collateral concern 
and such sanctions were not an assess-
ment of the legal merits of a case. Id. 
Relying on Cooter & Gellv. Hartmarx 
Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990), the Court 
state that "it is well established that a 
federal court may consider collateral 
issues after an action is no longer pend-
ing." Willy, 112 S. Ct. at 1080 (quot-
ing Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. 384). 
Willy supported his claim by citing 
United States Catholic Conference v. 
Abortion Rights Mobilization. Inc., 487 
U.S. 72 (1988), in which the Court 
concluded that if on remand, the dis-
trict court is found to be deficient in 
subject matter jurisdiction, the con-
tempt orders enacted by the district 
court must collapse. Willy, 112 S. Ct. 
at 1089. Based on this decision, Willy 
asserted that Rule 11 sanctions im-
posed by a district court without sub-
ject matter jurisdiction must fall. The 
Court rejected Willy's liberal applica-
tion of Catholic Conference the and 
emphasized the differences in the pur-
pose ofacivil contempt order and Rule 
11 sanctions. 
Since Rule 11 sanctions do not in-
volve the merits of a "case or contro-
versy," a federal court without subject 
matter jurisdiction over a case may 
constitutionally impose procedural 
rules which are collateral to the case at 
hand. Accordingly, parties must ob-
serve procedural rules, such as Rule 
11, when practicing before federal 
courts, whether or not they agree with 
the jurisdiction of that court. 
- Carol Nakhuda Cohen 
Rubin v. State: PROTECTION OF 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVI-
LEGE DOES NOT APPLY TO LO-
CATION AND CONDITION OF 
TANGIBLE EVIDENCE RE-
MOVED OR ALTERED BY DE-
FENSE COUNSEL EVEN IF IT IM-
PLICATES THE DEFENDANT. 
In a six to one decision, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that state-
ments made by a defendant in a crimi-
nal case to investigators she had hired 
in a related domestic matter were not 
protected by attorney-client privilege 
until her attorney specifically retained 
the investigators in the criminal mat-
ter. In Rubin v. State, 602 A.2d 677 
(Md. 1992), the court of appeals held a 
private investigator's testimony about 
statements made by the defendant be-
fore her attorney arrived at the murder 
scene did not violate attorney-client 
privilege. However, the court found 
that the investigator's testimony con-
cerning events occurring later violated 
her attorney-client privilege, but was 
harmless error. The court, although 
not explicitly doing so, appeared to 
adopt an exception to the attorney-
client privilege for evidence removed 
or altered by defense counsel. 
Lisa Rubin and Timothy Warner's 
1 O-year marriage was turbulent. It was 
marked by numerous affairs and the 
alleged attempted murder of Rubin's 
ex-lover. In March 1990, Warner 
moved out ofthe couple's home. Sev-
eral days later, Rubin engaged the ser-
vices of Prudential Associates, Inc., a 
private investigating agency, to prove 
that Warner was committing adultery. 
During the course of the investigation, 
Rubin developed a close relationship 
with Robert Miller, Prudential's presi-
dent, and told Miller that Warner had 
admitted to her that he had tried to kill 
her former lover. Millerrecommended 
that Rubin consult with Prudential's 
attorney, Darrel Longest, about a pos-
sible accessoryship problem. Rubin 
subsequently met with Longest and 
retained him to represent her. 
On April 23, 1990, Warner tele-
phoned Rubin concerning their dog. 
They agreed to meet at the 
veterinarian's office the following 
evening. After meeting at a parking 
lot, Rubin and Warner walked down a 
path through a wooded area. There, 
Rubin shot Warner nine times with a 
.38 caliber pistol, reloading twice in 
the process. Rubin then called Miller 
and arranged to meet him, without 
telling him the purpose ofthe meeting. 
Miller, along with an associate, 
Leopold, met Rubin and she subse-
quently led them to the murder site. 
Only after talking to Rubin and exam-
ining the scene did Miller call attorney 
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